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I. INTRODUCTION
Though ordinarily tolerated as an inexpensive source of
labor,' undocumented migrants are often viewed as a threat to public
welfare in turbulent and uncertain times.2 In light of the recent global
fixation on terrorist threats and economic recession, few would
consider the increasing prevalence of exclusionary state practices and
legislation unexpected. Indeed, it was in the name of national
security that President George W. Bush, following the September 11,
2001, attacks, ordered the United States Coast Guard to "turn back
any refugee that attempts to reach our shore."3
Even though such acts may run contrary to the internation-
ally recognized and mandated principle of non-refoulement,4 Ameri-
cans are quite accustomed to touting the right of the sovereign to
control movement across its borders 5 - a right certainly recognized
See generally Aristides Diaz-Pedrosa, Note, A Tale of Competing Policies: The
Creation of Havens for fllegal Immigrants and the Black Market Economy in the
European Union, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 431, 433 (2004).
2 See Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in
Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 190-91 (2007) ("The un-
documented migrant is characterized as an economic migrant who takes jobs from
U.S. residents, and drains welfare and other social services. This characterization can
be seen in Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s onwards. 'Illegal aliens' are
legally and culturally characterized as 'uninvited guests, intruders, trespassers, law
breakers.' . . . During the early 1990s, undocumented migrants continued to be
blamed for taking jobs from U.S. citizens, misusing public benefits, and failing to
assimilate." (citations omitted)).
3 See Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625, 642 (2009) ("Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft similar-
ly characterized the Haitian boat arrivals as a threat to American national security,
asserting that deterrence of all boat traffic, including genuine refugees, took clear
priority over the interests of potential refugees.").
4 Founded in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Statute of
Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol thereto, the principle of non-refoulement
protects those seeking international protection from being returned to states where
they are likely to face persecution. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention].
' See, e.g., Christopher Rudolph, International Migration and Homeland Security:
Coordination and Collaboration in North America, 11 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 433, 447
(2005) (contrasting American foreign policy legislation, which focuses on security
interests, against Canadian foreign policy legislation, which focuses on refugee
protection).
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throughout the world as "an important component of sovereignty." 6
In fact, exclusionist sentiments in the United States have rung loud
since the nineteenth century, when the United States Supreme Court
determined that the sovereign may deny re-admittance to even legal-
ly residing aliens.7 While support for such policy is not uncommon,
and is, in fact, even expected in the United States, ultra-exclusionist
state practices have received quite a contrary reception in the
comparatively-socialistic European Union ("EU" or "Union").8 Often
considered the birthplace of the modern refugee movement,9 Europe,
as loosely confederated through the Union, faces unique challenges
in its approach to refugee and asylum policy, particularly, in guar-
anteeing respect for non-refoulement.
That non-refoulement is a principle binding upon the Member
States of the European Union is not a contested issue;10 nor is it con-
tested that recent exclusionary practices by certain Member States11
violate the prohibition against refou lenient.12 To establish such is not
6 Nessel, supra note 3, at 687 (however, clarifying that "it is not an absolute right. It
is a right that must be balanced against international human rights, such as the right
to life and the right to seek and enjoy asylum").
7 CHAE CHAN PING V. UNITED STATES, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
8 See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, A Proposed North American Regional Development
Fund. The Next Phase of North American Integration Under NA FTA, 40 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 93, 127-28 (2008) (demonstrating an "impetus for a social policy in the
EEC" and "a resistance in the United States to any attempt to develop a welfare
state").
9 See, e.g., Kevin Walsh, Note, Victims of a Growing Crisis: A Callfor Reform of the
United States Immigration Law and Policy Pertaining to Refugees of the Iraq War,
53 VILL. L. REV. 421, 429 (2008).
10 See generally Nessel, supra note 3 (emphasizing that the "externalization of
borders" does not do away with obligations to respect the principle of non-refoule-
ment); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Tillmann L5hr, & Timo Tohidipur, Border Con-
trols at Sea: Requirements Under International Human Rights and Refigee Law, 21
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 256 (2009) (demonstrating that the prohibition against
refoulement, to which Member States are bound via various international and EU
instruments, applies extraterritorially).
11 See discussion infra Part 1I.
12 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUSHED BACK, PUSHED AROUND: ITALY'S FORCED
RETURN OF BOAT MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, LIBYA'S MISTREATMENT OF
MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 27, 28 (2009); see also Commission Staff Working
Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
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the purpose of this article. Rather, this article seeks to discover the
underlying reason for this unfortunate trend and to explore the feas-
ibility of an integrated European asylum system that would better
protect the right. The article first briefly explores in Section 11 the
recent increase of exclusionary practices in Southern Europe - parti-
cularly, those of the Member State seeming to most aggressively
embrace them - Italy. Section III then discusses the deficiencies in
Europe's current asylum system (i.e., why Europe's current system
fails at guaranteeing abidance to the non-refoulement principle) and
demonstrates that, in light thereof, such exclusionism was inevitable.
Section IV discusses the Union's attempt at stemming the recent tide
of exclusionism via the implementation of a Common European
Asylum System ("CEAS"). Finally, Section V concludes with a brief
assessment of this new system's likely success.
II. EXCEUSIONIST TRENDS
Perhaps more so than anywhere in the world, this wave of
exclusionism has permeated throughout the Member States of the
European Union.13 Spain, for instance, in response to an influx of
African migration, recently intercepted nearly 4,000 potential asylum
seekers headed for the Canary Islands and repatriated another 5,000
that had previously arrived.14 Operaci6n Hera II was carried out with
Committee of Regions Policy Plan on Asylum: an Integrated Approach to
Protection across the EU Impact Assessment, § 2.1.2.1, COM (2008) 360 final
(June 17, 2008) [hereinafter Policy Plan on Asyhm].
13 See id. § 2.1.2.1 ("Recent times have seen significant year on year decreases in the
number of persons seeking asylum in the EU. In 2006, however, the number of
refugees worldwide rose for the first time in many years (to reach 9.9 million) while
the number of asylum applications in the [EU] reached a 20 year low (197,150).");
Leigh Phillips, Commission Proposes Coordinated Reffigee Resettlement Across EU,
EU OBSERVER, September 9, 2009, http://euobserver.com/24/28612 ("In 2008,
countries offered to settle just 65,000 refugees, and European Union members were
particularly unenthusiastic in its efforts in this regard, resettling 4,378, or 6.7
percent.").
14 Nessel, supra note 3, at 651-52.
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the assistance of eight fellow Member States 15 and coordinated by the
Union's new border security agency, FRONTEX.' 6
Faced with its own recent influx of African migrants17 and
backed by the anti-immigrant Northern League Party, Italy's Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi easily garnered support in the legislature for
a bill criminalizing illegal immigration.18 The new legislation, which
passed in 2009, criminalizes unlawfully entering or staying in Italy by a
C5,000 to C10,000 fine; it triples the detention period of illegal migrants
to six months; it imposes criminal punishment - up to three years in
prison - on landlords who rent to undocumented migrants; it requires
parents registering a new birth to present documentation verifying
legal status; and it authorizes citizen anti-crime patrols.19
These legislative exclusionary efforts have been accompanied
by questionable state practices. In May 2009, and in accordance with
its Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the
Italian Republic and Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
(the "Friendship Pact," signed August 30, 2008), Italy began inter-
cepting boats carrying African migrants and returning them to Libya
before they could reach Italian territorial waters to petition for
asylum. 20 On May 6, 2009, Italian authorities picked up 230 African
15 Austria, Greece, Finland, France, Holland, Italy, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom. Id.
16 Id. FRONTEX's operation is authorized and regulated by Council Regulation
2007/2004/EC of October 26, 2004. Fischer-Lescano et al., supra note 10, at 257-58
("The operational framework coordinated by FRONTEX includes the regulation
establishing a mechanism to create Rapid Border Intervention Teams in order to
secure the EU's external borders. This same instrument significantly extends the
agency's executives powers .... In addition, the regulation gives interventionary
[sic] powers to all forces deployed in joint FRONTEX operations, thus enabling
them to support local border police .... ).
17 Italy Adopts Law to Curb Migrants, BBC NEWS, July 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/8132084.stm ("More than 36,000 migrants landed on the shores of
Italy last year - an increase of about 7 5 % on the year before.").
18 Id.
19 Valentina Pop, Italy Approves Harsh Anti-Immigration Bill, EU OBSERVER, May
14, 2009, http://euobserver.com/?aid-28124 [hereinafter Pop 1]; BBC NEWS, supra
note 17.
20 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 7 ("The Friendship Pact called for
'intensifying' cooperation in 'fighting terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking
and illegal immigration."').
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migrants thirty-five miles off the southern shore of Lampedusa21 and
returned them to Libya without any assessment of their possible need
for international protection.22 On June 18, 2009, the Italian Coast
Guard, in accordance with FRONTEX's Operation Nautilus IV, inter-
cepted a boat twenty-nine miles south of Lampedusa.23 The boat was
carrying seventy-five migrants, whom the Italian Coast Guard
handed over to a Libyan patrol boat, which purportedly turned the
group over to a Libyan military unit.24 Two weeks later, the Italian
Navy intercepted a boat carrying eighty-two migrants and forcibly
transferred them to a Libyan vessel, again, without any proper
assessment of the need for protection.25 And in August 2009, the
Italian Coast Guard intercepted a boat carrying seventy-five Somali
migrants and returned them to Libya, again without assessing their
need for protection.26 These are not all of the forced returns that have
occurred since Italy started the practice, 27 but they are demonstrative
examples of the growing trend.
Though these accounts may be discounted on the notion that
many not in need of protection are among the groups of migrants,
UNHCR reports: "[i]n 2008, an estimated 75 percent of sea arrivals in
Italy applied for asylum and 50 percent of them were granted some
form of protection." 28 Such figures clearly demonstrate that states
participating in these practices are turning away many entitled to
21 Lampedusa is a small island located between Tripoli and Sicily in the Mediter-
ranean. It is traditionally known as a stop-off for migrants making their way through
to the European mainland but is now heavily patrolled by Italian naval forces and
FRONTEX authorities. Id at 28-29.
22 Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR Deeply Concerned over Returns from Italy to
Libya (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/print/4a02d4546. html.
23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 37.
24 id.
25 AFP, Italy Denounces UN Complaint over Refugees, July 14, 2009, http://www.
google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jeNUjjOWVNF 1JGWOJdRGxJ2xS6Rw
(July 14, 2009).
26 Earthtimes.org, Italy Intercepts, Sends back 75 African Refugees, Aug. 30, 2009,
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/printstory.php?news-283442.
27 See, e.g., Valentina Pop, Commission Dodges Stance on Italian Asylum, EU
OBSERVER, May 13, 2009, http://euobserver.com/?aid-28116 [hereinafter Pop 11]
(reporting that, in the first week of Italy's forced-return program, more than 500
migrants were returned to Libya without proper screening for protection needs).
28 UNHCR, supra note 22.
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international protection. Concern arises over this practice in light of
the fact that Libya is not a party to the Refugee Convention. Though
Libya is technically bound to the principle of non-refoulement through
other international instruments, 29 it has a non-existent asylum
system. Libya's Brigadier General Mohamed Bashir Al Shabbani was
quoted as stating: "[tihere are no refugees in Libya .... They are
people who sneak into the country illegally and they cannot be
described as refugees .... Anyone who enters the country without
formal documents and permission is arrested." 30 Consequently, the
migrants, if not detained as prisoners for years or dropped in the
desert, are often repatriated to their respective states-of-origin, where
they potentially face persecution and harsh punishment.31
Such dissidence against international obligations in the name
of sovereign protectionism has received much criticism. Italian Demo-
cratic Party member Marco Minitti, in reacting to the Legislature's
passing of the new immigration bill, stated: "[y]ou should listen to the
voice of the United Nations, you should listen to the authoritative
voice of the Church, people can not ignore this. This government
seems to be made up of supermen who have no respect for the UN." 32
In its report on the events, Human Rights Watch stated:
Italy violates the international legal principle of non-
refoulement when it interdicts boats on the high seas
and pushes them back to Libya with no screening
whatsoever.... The principle of nonrefoulement is a
binding obligation in international human rights law
and international refugee law, as well as European
and Italian law, which also forbid Italy from returning
people to places where they would face inhuman and
degrading treatment.33
29 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 49 ("[B]oth the Convention against
Torture and the African Refugee Convention forbid Libya from sending individuals
to countries where they face a serious risk of persecution or torture." (citations
omitted)).
3 ld. at 10.
31 See generally id at 68-91.
32 Pop 1, supra note 19.
33 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 7-10; see also Nessel, supra note 3, at
628 ("[T]he global focus on securitization and enforcement has weakened the
2010
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Despite widespread criticism, the European Commission
appears reluctant to sanction or otherwise rebuke Italy.34 Aside from a
simple request to readmit those turned away for processing to deter-
mine protection needs, and despite Berlusconi's politically-charged
stance,35 the Commission has yet to threaten legal proceedings. 36 To
the contrary, thanks to the success of "racist and xenophobic" parties
in the June 2009 European Parliamentary elections, the Commission
has recently "backed efforts to strengthen the EU border-control
agency Frontex to stop the influx of boat refugees .... 37
III. THE INHERENT SHORTCOMINGS OF EUROPE'S
CURRENT ASYLUM SYSTEM
The exclusionism movement has undoubtedly had an impact
on access to international protection in Europe. 38 This unfortunate
trend can be attributed to a failure of the current European asylum
system to guarantee that Member States respect the principle of non-
refoulernent. Though states worldwide have long been bound to
respect the principle, nowhere save the EU are they bound to do so in
refugee protection regime, particularly the obligations of the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees."). Cf Fischer-Lescano et al., supra
note 10, at 262-63 (using as examples Australia's and France's recent provisions
refusing to apply protections of the Refugee Convention to those arriving at off-
shore territories and explaining that "[t]hese approaches have been unanimously
criticized ... as legally irrelevant attempts to circumvent international obligations").
34 See Pop 11, supra note 27.
" Id. ("Mr. Berlusconi made immigration and security his main platform in last
year's general elections and seems to be repeating the strategy for the EU poll in
June as well.").
36 See Pop 1, supra note 19.
37 Shada Islam, Fortress Europe: Solving Immigration by Outsourced Bouncers,
YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, Aug. 18, 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/fortress-
europe-solving-immigration-outsourced-bouncers.
38 Human Rights Watch reported that "[w]ith the support of Frontex, the number of
irregular boat arrivals to the Canary Islands ... dropped by 74 percent from 2006 to
2008." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 36. As to Italy, Human Rights
Watch noted: "Irregular boat migrants to Sicily (including Lampedusa) and Sardinia
fell by 55 percent in the first six months of 2009 compared to the same period the
previous year. The migrant detention centers of Lampedusa... in January 2009...
were filled beyond capacity, holding nearly 2,000 people, and migrants were
sleeping on the floors. For a time in early June, the Lampedusa detention centers
were completely empty of migrants." Id. at 24.
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accordance with the collective will of a supra-national organization
capable of imposing it.39 That the Union has such competency actu-
ally provides it an opportunity, via the strengthening of a Common
European Asylum Policy, to more consistently and effectively guar-
antee the right than can sovereign states acting alone. This section,
however, seeks to briefly analyze Europe's current asylum system
and to demonstrate that the Union's failure to guarantee protection
against refoulement, manifested in these current exclusionist trends,
was inevitable.
A. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees
The principle of non-refoulenient, found in Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention, states that "[n] o Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the fron-
tiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion."4 0 The Convention defines a
"refugee" as a person who:
[O]wing to well founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.41
Though the Refugee Convention sets forth the basic sub-
stantive principle of non-refoulnient to which its parties are bound, it
39 See, e.g., Geoff Gilbert, Is Europe Living Up to Its Obligations to Reflgees?, 15
EUR. J. INT'L L. 963, 969 (demonstrating that, and the extent to which, "[a]sylum
and immigration issues were transferred to the European Union by the Member
States in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam").
40 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33.
41Id. art. 1(A)(2)
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suffers from two major fatal flaws: first, it fails to explicitly guarantee
a right to asylum proceedings; second, it lacks procedural mandates
to assure the protections it does explicitly guarantee (i.e., against
refoulement) are received by all whom the drafters envisaged would
be protected.42
The Refugee Convention's prohibition against refoulement is
unambiguous and explicit: "No Contracting State shall expel or
return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever. . . ,,43 How-
ever, it does not similarly grant a right to asylum, or even an explicit
right to an opportunity to claim asylum. 44 In light of the Convention's
provisional language ("to the frontiers of. . ."), which does not seem
to preclude transfer to a willing third country, most scholars agree
that a plain reading of the Convention itself, though prohibiting
refoulement, does not necessarily obligate parties to grant asylum. 45
That fact notwithstanding, most also agree that the right to effective
access to asylum proceedings is implicit in the Convention's non-
refoulement principle. As one scholar has observed:
42 See Ellen F. D'Angelo, Non-Refoulement. The Search for a Consistent Inter-
pretation of Article 33, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279, 285 (2009).
4, Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33 (emphasis added).
44 An important note is in order at this juncture. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter CFR] is binding upon all
Member States and includes both a prohibition against torture and inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment. Id. art. 4. It also includes a right to asylum "with
due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol
of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the
Treaty establishing the European Community." Id. art. 18. Many correctly point out
that this provision, in conjunction with Article 19 (which prohibits "remov[al],
exp[ulsion] or extradit[ion] to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment") equally binds Member States to the principle of non-
refoulement. See, e.g., Fischer-Lescano et al., supra note 10, at 281-82. Neverthe-
less, as the right to non-refoulement in the CFR only exists by reference to the
Refugee Convention, its application necessarily depends upon the scope of the right
under the Refugee Convention.
45 See, e.g., Heather A Leary, The Nature of Global Commitments and Obligations:
Limits on State Sovereignty in the Area of Asylum, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
297, 301 (1997) (demonstrating that the Refugee Convention does not "establish a
right to asylum."). Cf Fischer-Lescano et al., supra note 10, at 288 ("Worthy of note
is the fact that Article 18 [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union],
unlike the Refugee Convention, provides a[n explicit] right to asylum.").
V. 17
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST REFOULEMEATT
UNHCR and literature rightly state that non-refoule-
ment from Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Refugee
Convention is only guaranteed if the person con-
cerned can claim effective legal protection. Here, too,
the decisive factor ensuring effectiveness is for the
person concerned to have the possibility of claiming
legal protection on the contracting state's territory.
Consequently, Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Refugee
Convention contains the implicit right to effective
legal remedy. . . . UNHCR, EXCOM and literature
rightly say that at least temporary entry into state
territory must be granted.46
Nevertheless, absent an authority to lend binding interpretation to
textual ambiguities, sovereign states face little consequence for
interpreting voluntarily-entered international treaties in a way that
does not recognize rights that are merely implied. Though an explicit
right to asylum itself would have likely killed the Refugee Conven-
tion, its failure to include an explicit right to access asylum proceed-
ings has served as fodder for exclusionist practices, thus endangering
the guaranteed right against refoulement.
The Refugee Convention also fails to establish procedural
guidelines for determining entitlement to protection. Because the
Refugee Convention "lacks a supra-national enforcement mechanism
with de facto power to compel state behavior . . . " divergence from
its spirit is checked only by public opinion, national judicial
interpretation, and international influence.47 As protectionist trends
in influential countries like the United States and Australia - which
lack a supra-national overseer independent of sovereign self-interests
to guarantee protection against refoulment - have a tendency to
46 Fischer-Lescano et al., supra note 10, at 285, 287. Cf Leary, supra note 45, at 300
(arguing that "one could easily read" a right to asylum in the language of Article 34
of the Refugee Convention, which states that "'[t]he Contracting States shall as far
as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees."').
47 See D'Angelo, supra note 42, at 288 (describing the importance of opinio juris
and judicial decisions in implementing the provisions of the Refugee Convention).
2010
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
legitimize similar actions in other states, they become problematic on
a global scale.48
Assuring protection against refoulement poses an entirely
different and unique challenge in Europe because the principle has
been embraced by a regional body representative of various constitu-
ent sovereign interests, but with a will independent of them. Cognizant
of the above-mentioned shortcomings in the Refugee Convention and
the accompanying inherent dangers, the European Union has attemp-
ted to harmonize its Member States' asylum practices by propagating
various instruments regulating the field. The Council is obligated by
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("TEC") to adopt
"measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of
28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status
of refugees and other relevant treaties ... 49
B. Dublin II Regulation
Pursuant to this obligation, the Council adopted in 2003 the
Dublin II Regulation,50 which was enacted to "determine rapidly the
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, so as
to guarantee effective access to the asylum procedure and to prevent
abuse in the form of multiple asylum applications." 51 While Dublin II
48 See Maria O'Sullivan, Withdrmaving Protection Under Article IC(5) of the 1951
Convention: Lessons from Australia, 20 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 586, 610 (2008)
(demonstrating that the manner in which Australia interprets the Refugee Conven-
tion may have influence beyond Australian law); Nessel, supra note 3, at 699 (noting
that the manner in which the U.S. applies the Refugee Convention may reshape how
other nations interpret it as well).
49 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 63(a), Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3; see also Fischer-Lescano et al., supra note 10, at 281 (listing other relev-
ant treaties that bind Member States to the prohibition against refoulment, including
the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Punishment; the International Covenant an Civil and Political Rights; and
the European Convention on Human Rights).
'0 Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application
Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50)
1 [hereinafter Dublin 1I Regulation].
51 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], The Dublin 11 Regulation: A UNHCR
Discussion Paper, at 5 (Apr. 2006) (prepared by Laura Kok) (citing 4 of the
Preamble of the Dublin 11 Regulation) [hereinafter UNHCR Discussion Paper].
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successfully established a "hierarchy of criteria" to determine which
Member State shall bear the responsibility of processing a given
application for asylum, 52 it did little to guarantee protection against
refoulement.53
As demonstrated by the UNHCR in its assessment of the
Dublin system, Member States have utilized protection gaps and
ambiguities therein to the detriment of asylum seekers. Greece, for
instance, has instituted a procedure whereby the state may "inter-
rupt" an asylum procedure if the applicant is "arbitrarily absent" and
may deny the application without effective access to appeal or with-
out substantive review of the claim.54 Because of refoulement risks
inherent in the policy, several European states have refrained from
returning protection-seekers to Greece for application processing.55
Both Ireland and Luxembourg have enacted 'automatic-with-
drawal'-type provisions that deem an application withdrawn, thus
precluding substantive examination without effective access to
appeal, if compliance with arbitrary or unreasonable time constraints
is not satisfied.56 Other states, though prohibiting denial of a claim
without substantive review, allow substantive review to proceed in
the absence of the applicant.57 These summary procedures likewise
create a very real risk of refoulenient.
Despite the binding and directly applicable nature of the
Dublin II Regulation, like the Refugee Convention, it lacked the tools
necessary to guarantee effective protection against refoulement in
Europe. Perhaps the most widely held criticism of the Dublin II
Regulation is that it operated on the assumption that there already
existed in Europe a common asylum policy that deters forum-shop-
ping and, therefore, the need for exclusionist action.58 Two additional
Community instruments sought to fill the gap - the Qualifications
Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive.
52 See generally Dublin 11 Regulation, supra note 50, Ch. i1.
53 See UNHCR Discussion Paper, supra note 51, at 12 (arguing that Dublin 1I has not
harmonized the field of asylum, which could lead to "direct and indirect refoulment").
54 Id. at 46-47.
551d. at 47.
56 Id. at 48-49.
57 Id. at 49.
58 See Gilbert, supra note 39, at 971; see also UATHCR Discussion Paper, supra note
51, at 12.
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C. The Qualifications Directive
The Council adopted the Qualifications Directive59 in 2004 so
as to "ensure that Member States apply common criteria for the
identification of persons genuinely in need of international protec-
tion, and, on the other hand, to ensure that a minimum level of bene-
fits is available for these persons in all Member States." 60 The Qualifi-
cations Directive represents a significant step forward in the Com-
munity's approach to asylum matters. As one scholar has noted:
The Directive represents a remarkable development
in the field of international law for two reasons. It is
the first supranational instrument binding on EU
Member States to cover those in need of international
protection but who fall outside the provisions of the
1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol....
Secondly, it is the first supranational instrument bind-
ing on EU Member States that deals with refugee pro-
tection and subsidiary protection under the one
umbrella. The Directive defines 'international protec-
tion' as encompassing both refugee protection and
subsidiary protection and has important provisions
dealing with both.61
In creating a specific legal framework for subsidiary protection, the
Qualifications Directive extends legal entitlement to international
protection to persons previously not guaranteed protection 62 against
refoulenient.63
59 Council Directive 2004/83, On Minimum Standards for the Qualification and
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons
who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection
Granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Qualifications Directive].
60 Id. at pmbl., 6.
61 Hugo Storey, EU Refugee Qualification Directive: A Brave Nev World?, 20 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 1, 5 (2008) (citations omitted).
62 See id. at 5-8 (explaining that persons needing protection from human rights
violations, but not qualifying as "refugees" under the Convention's definition, were
previously limited to seeking protection under Art. 3 ECHR, which was subject to
being "withdrawn or reintroduced at executive whim").
6, See Qualifications Directive, supra note 59, arts. 20, 21.
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Nevertheless, despite the commendation deserved for extend-
ing the right to international protection, the Qualifications Directive
did little to secure effective protection against refoulement. While it
clarified the right to entitlement to protected status, it did not do the
same regarding the obligation of a Member State to permit access to
the asylum process and, therefore, did nothing to cure the deficien-
cies inherent in the Refugee Convention and the Dublin II Regula-
tion. In fact, given that the Qualifications Directive interprets one of
the Convention's grounds for exclusion as an exception to non-
refoulement, it arguably increases occurrences of refoulement.64
D. The Asylum Procedures Directive
In 2005, the Council adopted the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive,65 with the primary objective to "introduce a minimum framework
in the Community on procedures for granting and withdrawing
refugee status." 66 Though the Directive does not guarantee a right to
asylum, it is a move toward guaranteeing a right to access an asylum
procedure, and therefore, protection against refoulement. Indeed, it
appears that the drafters took notice of the shortcomings inherent in
the Refugee Convention and previous Community instruments:
In the interests of a correct recognition of those persons
in need of protection as refugees within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention, every applicant
should, subject to certain exceptions, have an effective
access to procedures . . . . Moreover, the procedure in
which the application for asylum is examined should
64 See Hugo Storey, supra note 61, at 23-4. ("[The Qualifications Directive] 'continues
to mix two different concepts of the 1951 Convention, the exclusion clauses of Article
IF and the exception to non-refoulement principle in Article 33(2) in a way which
endangers the proper application of the 1951 Convention."' (citations omitted)).
65 Council Directive 2005/85, On Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member
States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005 O.J. (L. 326) 13 (EC)
[hereinafter Asylum Procedures Directive].66 Id. at pmbl., 5.
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normally provide an applicant at least with the right to stay
pending a decision by the determining authority .... 67
Attempting to further strengthen protection against refoule-
nient, the Asylum Procedures Directive guarantees substantive review
of all asylum applications. 68 And though it provides two exceptions to
this guarantee, 69 it subjects them to a caveat: "Member States should
only proceed [to apply these exceptions] where this particular appli-
cant would be safe in the third country concerned." 70 Unfortunately, it
is this very "safe third country" 71 concept that has undermined the
Procedures Directive's protection against refoulement.
Article 25(2)(c) of the Procedures Directive permits a Member
State to deem inadmissible an asylum application if "a country which
is not a Member State is considered as a safe third country for the
applicant, pursuant to Article 27." Though Article 27(1)(b) forbids a
Member State from applying the safe third country concept absent
assurances that the applicant will be protected against refoulenient, it
leaves the determination entirely up to the state. 72 One scholar has
noted the significant inherent danger:
[That a Member State can remove an asylum seeker to a
safe third country without substantive review of the
application through national legislation complying
with Article 25] is premised on the notion that, accord-
ing to a destination country's own country information,
67 Id. at pmbl., 13 (emphasis added). The right to access to asylum procedures is
elaborated upon in Article 6; the right to stay pending review of the application in
Article 7.
68 Id. at pmbl., 22, art. 8.
69 Id. at pmbl., 22, ("Member States should examine all applications on the
substance ... except where ... it can be reasonably assumed that another country
would do the examination or provide sufficient protection."), and pmbl., 23, ("...
Member States should also not be obliged to assess the substance of an asylum
application where the applicant, due to a connection to a third country as defined by
national law, can reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country.").
70 1d. at pmbl., 23.
71 Elaborated upon at id, art. 27.
72 Id. art. 27(2) ("The application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to
rules laid down in national legislation, including .. ") (emphasis added).
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determining authorities can reliably presume that even
without a substantive examination, any applicant from
a designated safe third country will have no grounds
for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Hence, removing such applicants to that country will
presumptively involve no breach of the destination
country's international legal obligations. 73
However, it is abundantly clear that no such "reliable pre-
sumption" can be made under Article 27(2)(b). The provision provides
that a finding of "safe third country" status in a particular case be
based on methodology that includes "case-by-case consideration of the
safety of the country for a particular applicant and/or national designa-
tion of countries considered to be generally safe." 74 As suggested:
[Tjhe term of art 'and/or' substantially weakens this
safeguard because it grants broad executive discretion
to subsume individual applications entirely within
Member States' own generic assessments concerning
the 'general safety' of third countries. Such a formu-
lation does not specifically require an empirical
inquiry into the safety of a third country for an
individual asylum seeker... Article 25 grants deter-
mining authorities wide latitude to use the pre-
liminary examination stage inappropriately for deter-
mining applications substantively unmeritorious so
as to facilitate the speedy removal of asylum seekers
to non-EU third countries. A foreseeable practice such
as this creates a palpable risk of secondary move-
ments and refoulement due to the increased possibility
of erroneous admissibility decisions. 75
73 Michael John-Hopkins, The Emperor's New Safe Country Concepts. A UK
Perspective on Sacrificing Fairness on the Altar of Efficiency, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 218, 222 (2009).
74 Asylum Procedures Directive, supra note 65, art. 27(2)(b) (emphasis added).
75 John-Hopkins, supra note 73, at 222-23.
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Similarly, Article 27(2)(a) requires a determination of "safe
third country" status to be determined by "rules requiring a connec-
tion between the person seeking asylum and the third country con-
cerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to
go to that country." 76 However, the Directive fails to define that
which qualifies as a connection "on the basis of which it would be
reasonable for that person to go to that country." 77 Lacking any such
interpretational guidance, Member States have broadly expanded the
safe third country concept in a manner that weakens protection
against refoulenient.78
Though the Asylum Procedures Directive addressed the
shortcomings inherent in previous Community instruments, it did
nothing to "promote the approximation of fair procedural rules for
granting or withdrawing refugee status." 79 In fact:
[Ujnlike within the fields of EC law and jurispru-
dence relating to social policy and the internal
market, there are neither provisions within the Proce-
dures Directive nor ECJ jurisprudence that restrict or
rule out any national margin of appreciation in inter-
preting Article 27 paragraph (2)(a) so as to prevent
differing treatment of comparable applicants seeking
asylum across EU Member States.80
Affording Member States such discretion in determining an
applicant's right to access the asylum process has proven quite hazar-
dous to protection against refoulment in Europe. Faced with recent
influxes of migrants - both legitimate asylum seekers and otherwise -
the Southern Members in particular have taken advantage of such
76 Asylum Procedures Directive, supra note 65, art. 27(2)(a).
77 John-Hopkins, supra note 73, at 224.
71 Id. (illustrating that such lack of direction has permitted the UK to construe what
constitutes a reasonable connection "in such a circumscribed fashion under [its
domestic] Immigration Rule 345(2) that it catches any asylum seeker who has had
'an opportunity at the border or within the third country or territory to make contact
with the authorities of that third country or territory in order to seek their protec-
tion."').
79 id.
80 Id. at 224-25.
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discretionary provisions by broadly interpreting the safe third coun-
try concept. Aside from the obvious detriment such practices can
have on the individual asylum seeker, the wider implications are
devastating. Rosemary Byrne and her colleagues observe that "there
is a very real cost to embracing more progressive policies when one's
neighbours are creating procedural and substantive barriers to
protecting refugees." 81 They explain that the "fear of becoming a
targeted 'soft touch' or 'closed sack"' for asylum seekers turned away
elsewhere leads to the "rippling of restrictive practices." 82 "[I]t is
predictable," they continue, "that a lateral spiraling of like policies
will occur in neighboring jurisdictions."83
It was all too predictable that the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive, absent safeguards to assure proper application of the safe third
country concept, would encourage exclusionist practices and, ulti-
mately, decrease protection against refoulement. Community Direc-
tives, because they regulate fields in which the Member States retain
significant competencies, generally check discriminatory application
via stringent and clear equal treatment-type provisions.84 The
absence of such provisions in the Procedures Directive, considered
together with the discretion afforded the Member States in deter-
mining safe third country status, essentially sealed the Directive's
fate. As noted:
On the basis that the types of unconditional and
directly effective anti-discrimination provisions mani-
fest within other fields of EU law do not apply within
the field of justice and home affairs, a literal and
logical interpretation of Article 27 paragraph (2)(a)
would appear to be that Member States have com-
plete discretion to define the requisite connection
between a person seeking asylum and a third country.
Affording Member States such discretion, without
there being any substantive safeguards in place ...
81 Rosemary Byrne, et al., Understanding Refugee Law in an Enlarged European
Union, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 355, 375 (2004).
82 id.
83 Id. at 376.
84 John-Hopkins, supra note 73, at 225.
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makes it easier to reject and return asylum seekers to
third countries outside the EU, solely on the basis that
asylum seekers can reasonably be expected to seek
protection from another state.85
Though aimed at assuring effective access to the asylum pro-
cess, the Directive, in affording Member States such latitude in deter-
mining whether a given refugee was "safe" elsewhere, has sanc-
tioned - via Community codification - the return of possible asylum
seekers to territories where they risk discriminatory persecution.
The current European asylum system has endangered
protections afforded by the Refugee Convention: first, by limiting
responsibility for the processing of a given application lodged any-
where in Europe to a single one of its Member States (via the Dublin
II Regulation); and subsequently, by allowing that one Member State,
with wide discretion, to determine that application inadmissible - in
all of Europe - on account of a state-determined "connection" with
some "safe" third country (via the Asylum Procedure Directive).
Fortunately, these failed instruments comprise but the first phase of
the Union's transition to a Common European Asylum System
(CEAS), and so hope for effective protection against refoulement in
Europe still lives.
IV. STEMMING THE TIDE OF EXCLUSIONISM: A COMMON EUROPEAN
ASYLUM SYSTEM ("CEAS")
A. The Failure of the First Phase Instruments
The notion of a CEAS was born of the 2004 Hague Pro-
gramme and accompanying Action Plan, whose purpose it was to
"help strengthen freedom, security and justice in the European
Union" via, inter alia, the establishment of "an effective harmonized
[asylum] procedure in accordance with the European Union's values
and humanitarian traditions." 86 One means by which the Programme
8' Id. at 225-26.
86 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Justice, Freedom and Security in Europe Since 2005 : An Evaluation of the Hague
Programme and Action Plan An Extended Report on the Evaluation of the Hague
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attempted to do so was through the formation of a CEAS, which itself
was to be facilitated via implementation of the 'first phase' instru-
ments expounded upon above.87
The attendant shortcomings are clear; the European Commis-
sion itself, in its Policy Plan on Asylum,88 acknowledged the extent to
which ambiguities in the Union's current instruments hamper
effective protection against refoulement:
[SItates are implementing an increasing array of
legitimate border control measures that may some-
times lack the necessary mechanisms to identify
potential asylum seekers and allow their access to the
territory and subsequently to an asylum procedure. It
has been criticized that this could lead in exceptional
cases to the violation of the principle of non-refoule-
ment as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention at
Europe's borders.89
In addressing the disparities between Member States in their recog-
nition rates of those entitled to protection, the Commission noted:
[Alnalysis clearly shows that there are significant dif-
ferences in recognition rates between Member States,
mainly due to differences across [the] EU in terms of
practices, procedures, diverse country of origin infor-
mation sources and decision-making processes for
granting protection and, therefore, a lack of harmoni-
zation of the national policies and procedures in the
field of asylum .... 90
Programme §§ 1.1, 1.2, EU:SEC(2009) 766 finalOE (June 10, 2009) (hereinafter
Evaluation of the Hague Programme).
87 Id. § 3.2.1 (1)
88 The intent of the Policy Plan on Asylum was to "define a blueprint for the coming
years and list the measures that the Commission intends to take in order to complete
the second phase of the CEAS ... ." Policy Plan on Asylum, supra note 12, § 1.
89 1d. § 2.1.2.1.
90 Id. § 2.1.2.6; see also Evaluation of the Hague Programme, supra note 86, § 3.2.1.
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Finally, in addressing the danger of arbitrary detainment, the Com-
mission points out that "[viagueness in the definition of the cases
when an asylum-seeker can be detained has led to some Member
States systematically detaining all asylum-seekers while others never
use detention." 91
B. The Second Phase of Establishing a Common European Asylum
System
The Commission determined that these ambiguities prevent
even perfect implementation of the current instruments from guaran-
teeing equal protection against refoulement in the various Member
States.92 In doing so, the Commission implemented a "second phase
of the CEAS . . . to offer, through a comprehensive approach to
protection across the EU, appropriate status, under equal conditions,
to any third-country national requiring international protection in
compliance with fundamental rights, in particular with the principle
of non refoulement." 93 In its subsequent European Pact on Immigra-
tion and Asylum, the European Council likewise determined that
"the time has come to take new initiatives to complete the establish-
ment of a Common European Asylum System, provided for in the
Hague programme, and thus to offer a higher degree of protection, as
proposed by the Commission in its asylum action plan."94
To this end, the Commission analyzed several approaches to
future Community action so as to determine how to best effectuate
uniform protection against refoulement in the EU.95 The Commission
rejected three policy options: "maintenance of the status quo"; an
"overall comprehensive legal instrument on asylum and creation of a
European Asylum Authority"; and "full scale harmonisation of EU
legislation." 96 Alternatively, the Commission proposed that future
action will best be realized via the combination of two less-extremist
91 Policy Plan on Asylum, supra note 12, § 2.2.
92 Id.
9'Id. § 3.1.
94 Council of the European Union, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, at 11
(13440/08) (Sept. 24, 2008) (calling for Commission proposals for the establishment
of "a single asylum procedure comprising common guarantees and for adopting a
uniform status for refugees and the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection").
95 Policy Plan on Asylum, supra note 12, § 4.
96 Id. §§ 4, 5, 6.
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options: "further harmonisation of EU legislation" and increased
support of the "cooperation and exchange of best practices" between
Member States.97
In fact, initial actions taken by the Union in response to
concerns over refoulenient demonstrate its preference for facilitating
cooperation among Member States rather than imposing additional
restrictions on state sovereignty. For instance, in 2006, the Commis-
sion acknowledged the need for " [an objective, transparent and
accurate [Country of Origin Information] system that delivers official,
rapid and reliable information." 98 In the interest of "levelling the
asylum playing field,"99 it proposed the establishment of a "'common
portal' through which all Member States [sic] authorities could
access, through one stop, all official COI databases ... ."100 This com-
munication also proposed the strengthening of practical cooperation
between Member States in asylum matters through "[siingle Proce-
dure activities"1 01; addressing "particular pressures situations" 102;
and training asylum service personal. 10 3
97 Id (reasoning that this combination offers nearly as many positive impacts as the
'comprehensive legal instrument' option while entailing "lower transposition diffi-
culties and financial and implementation costs"; that the 'further harmonisation'
option "imposes a slightly lower level of harmonisation in some areas" than the 'full
scale harmonisation' option and therefore has "better chances of being successfully
transposed and implemented"; and that the 'comprehensive legal instrument' option
"has one main drawback [in that] the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States
to the proposed European Asylum Authority does not have chances, at this stage, of
being accepted by the majority of Member States").
98 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on Strengthened Practical Cooperation, at 12, COM (2006) 67 final (Feb. 17,
2006) (noting that such a COI system is "central to any assessment of whether a
person should benefit from international protection") [hereinafter Strengthened
Practical Cooperation].
99 Id.
'00 Id. at 13. For criteria reflecting "current best international judicial practice adopted
when assessing how much weight can be attached to a particular COI source or
reference," see Judicial Criteria for Assessing Country of Origin Information (COI): A
Checklist, Paper for the 7th Biennnial IARLJ World Conference, Mexico City, 6-9
Nov. 2006 COI-CG Working Party, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 149, 154 et seq.
1 Strengthened Practical Cooperation, supra note 98, § 3.1 (citation omitted).
102 Id. § 3.3.
103 Id. § 3.4.
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The Commission's Communication on the Establishment of a
Joint EU Resettlement Programme1 04 also seeks to increase protection
against refoulement by facilitating cooperation in asylum matters
while minimizing intrusions on state sovereignty. 105 The Commission
took note of Europe's underrepresentation in refugee resettlement1 06
and, accordingly, sought to "involve more Member States in
resettlement activities . *."..,107 Specifically, the Commission sought,
through the Programme:
(1) to increase the humanitarian impact of the EU by
ensuring that it gives greater and better targeted sup-
port to the international protection of refugees through
resettlement, (2) to enhance the strategic use of resettle-
ment by ensuring that it is properly integrated into the
Union's external and humanitarian policies generally,
and (3) to better streamline the EU's resettlement
efforts so as to ensure that the benefits are delivered in
the most cost-effective manner.108
And though the Commission was quick to list as the Programme's
first guiding principle, "Participation by Member States in resettle-
ment should remain voluntary," 109 it was nevertheless sure to pro-
mote Member State participation by incentivizing cooperation. 110
104 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the Establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme, COM (2009)
447 (Sept. 2, 2009).
105 Id. § 2.2 ("[S]tructures and procedures for coordinating resettlement policy in the
EU should [ ] be adopted to enable closer cooperation among Member States and
more effective coordination of resettlement activities at the EU level.").
106 Id. § 2.1 (observing that Europe only took in 6.7% of refugees resettled world-
wide in 2008, less than half of what Canada accepts annually).
107 id.
108 Id. § 3.
109 Id. § 3.1 (noting "[t]here are currently considerable differences between Member
States with respect to the numerical targets and specific caseloads they wish to re-
settle, the legal criteria which are used for deciding who to resettle, and the partners
through which resettlement is carried out").
110 The Communication includes a proposal by the Commission to amend the
European Refugee Fund Ill Decision so as to provide cooperating Member States a
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Finally, like the "common portal for COI" and the Joint EU
Resettlement Programme, the Commission's February 18, 2009
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Asylum Support Office"' similarly demonstrates
the EU's promotion of a more effective CEAS via the enhancement of
cooperation among Member States1 12 as opposed to the further
restriction of state sovereignty. Cautious of intruding upon state
sovereignty, the Proposal itself provides that "[tihe agency will not
have decision-making powers and will engage in support activities
that act as an incentive to practical cooperation on asylum, such as
recommendations, referral to scientific authority, networking and
pooling of good practice, evaluation of the application and imple-
mentation of rules, etc." 3
C. European Asylum Policy under the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union
These early assurances of respect for sovereign discretion in
the effectuation of a CEAS notwithstanding, it appears that the future
of asylum policy in the European Union will, in fact, more closely
resemble the "full scale harmonization" approach, and possibly even
near the "European Asylum Authority" approach, expounded
above.114
In light of Ireland's recent approval of the Lisbon Treaty in its
second referendum held October 2, 2009,115 the current legal base for
one time, lump sum payment of C4,000 per resettled refugee under the Programme.
Id. § 3.2.1.
I Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Asylum Support Office, COM (2009) 66 final (February 18,
2009). Developed to provide the necessary structural support, coordination and
funding for these measures, and "whose task will cover all practical cooperation
activities [and which] will also help Member States faced with particular pressures
on their asylum systems by coordinating asylum expert teams, and possibly assisting
overburdened Member States." Evaluation of the Hague Programme, supra note 86,
§ 3.2.1.11.
112 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Asylum Support Office, supra note 111.
113 Id. at Explanatory Memorandum, 3.
114 See explanation supra, pp. 26-27.
115 Honor Mahoney, Irish Vote Unleashes Flurry of EU Activity, EU OBSERVER, Oct.
3, 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/28773?print-1 ("The final vote showed that 67.1
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Europe's asylum policy is almost certain to soon be replaced by the
new consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union ("TFEU"). 116 The TFEU will establish "uniform
statuses for asylum and subsidiary protection" and "common asylum
procedures" as "objectives of primary community law" and will
create "a legal obligation . . . to consider proposals for achieving
those objectives through secondary legislation."117 Recognizing the
need for "a systematic approach to the asylum acquis . . .[which]
leav[es] no space for gaps and inconsistencies," and for a "recon-
sideration of the wide discretion currently enabling Member States to
derogate from the agreed minimum standards,""x 8 the Commission
has decided to await ratification of the Lisbon Treaty before
amending the Qualifications Directive and the Asylum Procedures
Directive. 119
In addition to curbing dangers of refoulement caused by incon-
sistent and unfaithful interpretations of the secondary Community
instruments, the TFEU will discourage, and possibly preempt,
bilateral agreements between individual Member States and third
countries tending to violate the right. Article 7 8( 2 )(g) lists as an
element of the CEAS "partnership and cooperation with third coun-
tries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for
asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection."x20 In explaining the
attendant preemptive effect and justifying EU action in the field, the
Commission notes:
percent voted in favour of the new rules while 32.9 percent voted against, a 20
percent swing to the Yes side, when compared to the country's rejection of the EU
Treaty last year.").
116 Policy Plan on Asylum, supra note 12, § 2.3. The Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]
envisions a drastic restructuring of the current treaty system. For a brief but compre-
hensive review of the various changes instituted by the Treaty of Lisbon, see gener-
ally Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty of Lisbon and its Impact on the European
Union's Democratic Deficit, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 445 (2008).
117 Policy Plan on Asylum, supra note 12, § 2.3.
118 Id
119 Id.
120 TFEU, supra, note 116, art. 78(2)(g)
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First, . . . it would not make sense to deal with
third countries on asylum issues on a national basis. It
stems from the fulfilment [sic] of the CEAS at the
internal EU level that common external action is
necessary.
Second, from the point of view of effectiveness, it
is clear that aggregated EU action instead of 27
differentiated programmes can have more positive
impact ....
Third, the external impacts of the EU asylum
policy must be seen in the wider context of the EU's
external relations....
Finally, from the point of view of protection, third
countries need to meet their own obligations to safe-
guard international protection and the rights of
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, stemming
from the international human rights instruments they
are party to .... 121
These considerations played a role in the Union's decision to
engage in discussions with Libya, which resulted in a "Council
Conclusion on cooperation with Libya on migration issues," and
eventually, an "EU-Libya Framework Agreement" calling for "politi-
cal dialogue and cooperation on foreign policy, human rights, secur-
ity issues and migration." 122 The EU's assumption of migration
matters in the Mediterranean, by separating asylum policy from
sovereign self interests, would certainly offer more effective protec-
tion against refoulement. Whether these negotiations will supersede
Member States' agreements with third countries depends upon the
competence the Union assumes in the field under the TFEU, and also
on any potential conflict between the Union's and the interested
state's agreements with the third country. 123
121 Policy Plan on Asylum, supra note 12, § 2.3.
122 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 31-32.
121 See, e.g., Rafeal Leal-Arcas, Is EC Trade Policy up to Par?: A Legal Analysis
over Time Rome, Marrakesh, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional Treaty, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305, 352-53
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In September 2009, the Council met to discuss a new multi-
annual program for an area of Freedom, Security and Justice serving
the citizen - the Stockholm Program.124 Reaffirming its commitment
to a 2012 deadline for the establishment of a CEAS, the Council
Presidency acknowledged the need for consistent policy among
Member States in determining entitlement to protection status.125 To
this end, and with the expectation that the Treaty of Lisbon will soon
be ratified and the TFEU soon in effect, the Presidency suggested that
the EU itself seek accession to the Refugee Convention.126 The
significance is simple: rather than each of the Member States being
individually bound to the principle of non-refoulement, the Union
itself would be bound, further justifying centrist action in matters
traditionally sovereign.
As additional evidence that European asylum policy is
embracing "full scale harmonisation" of Member States' legislation,
the Stockholm Program calls for the EU assumption of agreements
with third countries regarding asylum matters.127 Although such
action leaves implementation of what may come of those agreements
to the Member States (which would not be the case were the Union to
endorse the "European Asylum Agency" approach), the Council
intends to enforce equal and obligatory application through institu-
tional oversight.128 This supervisory power will assure that sovereign
self interests do not impede protections against refoulement, including
access to asylum proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Though couched in terms of "practical cooperation" and
"mutual trust,"129 the Council's Presidency Note on the Stockholm
Program demonstrates the Union's divergence from deference
124 Council of the European Union, Presidency Note, The Stockholm Programme:
An Open and Secure Europe Serving the Citizen, § 5 (14449/09) (Oct. 16, 2009)
[hereinafter the Stockholm Programme] (Oct. 16, 2009).
125 Id. § 5.2 ("It is crucial that individuals, regardless of the Member State in which
their application for asylum is lodged, are offered the same level of treatment as
regards reception conditions, procedural arrangements and status determination.")126 Id. § 5.2.1.
127 The Stockholm Programme, supra note 124, § 5.2.1.
128 id.
129 Id. §§ 5.1.5, 5.2.1.
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traditionally granted to its sovereign members in asylum policy and
to a policy of a fully harmonized, institutionally coordinated system.
While some progress regarding coordination of Member State legis-
lation in the field of asylum was realized under the first phase
instruments, they proved incapable of guaranteeing effective protec-
tion against refoulement. Despite an explicit guarantee under the
Asylum Procedures Directive to access to an asylum procedure,
Member States took advantage of the lack of procedural safeguards.
In doing so, they disadvantaged thousands potentially entitled to
international protection by applying the "safe third country" concept
in a manner contrary to its actual intent.
Fortunately, the enactment of the second phase of a Common
European Asylum System, aimed at rectifying the shortcomings of
the first phase instruments, is well under way. While early second
phase actions appeared to demonstrate a reluctance to intrude upon
the sovereign domain, the Union's most recent expressions suggest
the opposite. The subtle but very real shift is a reaction to the
questionable practices of some Member States in the Mediterranean.
If implemented correctly, the second phase of the CEAS has
the potential to guarantee effective protection against refoulement
short of the need for full scale integration. It appears much could be
accomplished simply by limiting sovereign discretion in designating
"safe third country" status under Article 27 in the same manner it is
limited in designating "safe country of origin" status under Article
31.130 Under Art. 31(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, subject to
certain safeguards, a Member State "shall... consider the application
for asylum as unfounded where the third country is designated safe
pursuant to Article 29."131 Article 29, in turn, provides that only
countries approved and designated as such by the Council in a
"minimum common list of third countries" may be deemed "safe" by
the Member States.132 Article 29 thus eliminates Member State discre-
tion (and thereby abuses wrought in self-interests) in determining
whether a given application is unfounded.133 Furthermore, Article
130 Asylum Procedures Directive, supra note 65, arts. 27, 31.
131 Id. art. 31(2)
32 Id. art. 29.
133 While Article 30 arguably nullifies this protection by allowing Member States,
without prejudice to Article 29, to likewise make "safe country of origin" designa-
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31(1) provides that the "safe country of origin" designation, whether
under Article 29 or 30, may only be made "after an individual exam-
ination of the application," thereby assuring, at a minimum, access to
the asylum procedure and some level of substantive review of a
given application.134
Adopting a "minimum common list" regarding safe third
country designation and allowing its utilization only after individual
examination of an application (a feat more feasible once the TFEU has
come into effect) - and thereby limiting sovereign discretion in
determining whether a given Member State is obligated to review a
given application - would offer better and more effective protection
against refoulement than is realized under the current European
asylum system. As explained, "the CEAS has a chance to emancipate
itself from the heritage of sub-regional norms and move from a state-
centrist perspective towards an institutionalist-unionist one only
when it has shifted into the second phase."1 35 While it is clear that
achieving such results will require additional relinquishment of
closely-cherished sovereign rights, a Europe operational under the
new TFEU is obligated to such a commitment. Fortunately, this
second phase is under way. If properly implemented, Europe may
very well assume its appropriate place as an international model for
effective protection against refoulement.
tions, it checks Member State abuse by obligating them to notify the Commission
when making such designations, thereby providing the Union potential recourse
prior to abusive application. Id. at art. 30(6). Though Member States are similarly
obligated to notify the Commission of the countries to which it applies the "safe
third country" concept, it is only required to do so "periodically," and, therefore,
potential exists for abusive application before the Union can challenge arbitrary
designation.
134 Id. art. 31(1).
135 Byrne, et al., supra note 81, at 367.
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